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correspondence took place, including
information on the drafts and staff
discussions related to some of the
letters and the issues involved.
For many Western historians, the popular
emphasis in the English-language literature on Churchill and Roosevelt obscured
a full appreciation and understanding
of Stalin’s role in the Western alliance.
Although West German scholars at the
German Armed Forces Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt had begun their
pioneer work in the analysis of the history
of Germany’s wartime eastern front
during the Cold War, their work was
not widely appreciated until the English
translations appeared. The simultaneous events of the Cold War, during
which these initial Western historical
interpretations developed, by and large
did not provide fertile ground for the
growth of sympathetic appreciations of
Stalin or of the Soviet role in the war,
despite some efforts in that direction.

records of staff discussion relating to the
writing of the messages. The editors have
presented in this volume about 75 percent
of the total correspondence; they intend
eventually to publish the full correspondence in an online edition. The editors
have given here the English-language
version of the letters that Roosevelt and
Churchill received, including errors of
translation and transmission, explaining
in the accompanying text the issues
involved. Reynolds and Pechatnov
have selected documents that show the
character of these leaders as illustrated
in their exchanges with each other, their
plans to meet each other in the wartime
conferences at Tehran and Yalta, and
all the principal issues they discussed.
This volume very successfully merges
documentary scholarship with a clearly
written and engaging history of the
interrelationships between these three
“unlikely musketeers.” Practitioners and
students of international relations, policy,
and strategy as well as the general audience of readers interested in the Second
World War will find this an invaluable
contribution to their understanding of
the complex relationships among these
three important wartime leaders.

Between 22 June 1941, when Germany
invaded the Soviet Union, and Roosevelt’s death on 12 April 1945, Churchill,
Roosevelt, and Stalin exchanged 682
messages in the form of secret enciphered
telegrams. The messages normally were
sent in the originator’s language and
translated into the recipient’s language.
The common practice of the time
of changing the order of words in a
sentence to make enemy decryption
difficult led to misunderstandings
and misinterpretations even beyond
those presented by translation itself.

The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future
of High-Tech Warfare, by Christian Brose. New
York: Hachette, 2020. 320 pages. $28.

The project that produced this volume
lasted a decade and involved careful
research in British, American, and newly
opened Russian archives. The editors
and their team developed a database
of more than five thousand documents
that included all the surviving drafts and

The author, Christian Brose, worked
closely as an aide to Senator John
McCain, and therefore is well situated to
write knowledgeably about the current
and future challenges facing the military
forces of the United States. The result is
a profoundly challenging and important
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book that should be required reading for
defense scholars and military officers.
Brose offers a full-throated critique of the
existing structures of American military
forces, the acquisition systems that supply
those forces, and the established assumptions that have guided U.S. defense policy
through a historically abnormal period
of American geopolitical dominance. He
argues forcefully that those established
ways of doing business already are
failing, and that they threaten to fail
catastrophically amid the foreseeable
return of great-power tensions and
possible conflict, with Russia to some
degree, but more importantly with China.
The United States has relied on large,
very expensive, and eminently targetable
platforms, such as aircraft carriers, and
relatively short-range fighter aircraft,
which are dependent on equally target
able refueling platforms. The proliferation
of large numbers of defensive missiles
and better sensors by China and Russia
renders such platforms unsurvivable
in any direct military engagement. The
American assumption that it will have
months to flow forces from the continental United States, unimpeded by potential
adversaries, is equally insupportable,
he argues. Historically, he maintains,
U.S. defense planning has focused on
platforms (which are usually extremely
expensive, human operator intensive, and
irreplaceable in any short time frame).
The future of war will be less about platforms and more about sensor fusion and
networked situational awareness—software rather than hardware, as he puts it.
No stranger to the ways of Congress,
Brose clearly dissects the political
and economic reasons why changing a slow, inflexible, excessively
bureaucratic, and backward-looking
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defense-acquisition process will be
difficult; but, he argues, not impossible.
It will require, however, that the services
be far more politically savvy than they
generally have been historically.
Committed to more than diagnosis, Brose
offers what he considers “cures.” Future
forces must rebuild a healthy relationship
with the high technology from which,
he argues, the Defense Department has
become alienated. Future forces must
rely heavily on autonomous systems,
linked decentralized networks, and
artificial intelligence if we are to create
the swarms of systems and decentralized
networks that will be able to survive in
a battle space in which we vie with a
peer competitor or, in the case of China,
perhaps even a technologically superior
adversary. Advances in additive technologies and on-site manufacturing may
make it possible to replace destroyed but
expendable, relatively low-cost systems
in the field, greatly reducing logistics
chains and reducing costs. Absolutely
contemporary, Brose offers a balanced
critique of the Trump administration’s
treatment of allies (agreeing that some are
freeloading to a degree, but also noting
that the United States rarely accepts serious allied assistance in real combat, and
also arguing for the absolute necessities
of keeping and reworking our alliance
system to face serious peer competitors).
Whether in the end a reader agrees
completely with Brose or not, this work
is a bracing challenge to American
complacency resting on the American
experience of unchallenged military
dominance since World War II, and offers
a wake-up call that defense planners and
military officers should take seriously.
MARTIN L. COOK
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